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INTRODUCTION
The United States, Canada, and Mexico have renegotiated the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For a time, the
three-party negotiations actually broke into bilateral negotiations,
first between the U.S. and Mexico and then between the U.S. and
Canada. Now that the three countries have reached a new agreement,
it is incumbent upon Congress to inquire thoroughly into the dispute
settlement mechanisms (DSMs) contained in the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA). Congress’ hearings held prior to
approving NAFTA failed to consider serious constitutional questions, particularly about the DSMs and more generally about U.S.
sovereignty. It is imperative that Congress not make the same mistake when considering approving the new USMCA.
The most important dispute in the renegotiation over NAFTA –
at least as between Canada and the United States – was not about
tariffs and trade barriers themselves, but about the mechanisms for
resolving disputes under the agreement. NAFTA’s DSMs received
minimal mention in the U.S. media, though Canadian media were
much more attuned to the issue. Mexico apparently also opposed
dismantling the dispute settlement mechanism,1 but Mexico was
*John S. Baker, Jr. is a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University Law Center
and Professor Emeritus at Louisiana State University. He would like to thank
Zachary Enos for his assistance on research.
**Lindsey Keiser is a 2016 graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and
is currently the Director of Research at the Foundation for Self Government.
1
Ana Swanson, Here’s What Canada and Mexico will Hate about Trump’s
NAFTA Plans, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/18/heres-what-canada-and-mexico-will-
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likely more concerned about matters related to the trade imbalance
with the United States.2 Trade between the U.S. and Canada has
been more closely balanced—at least if you calculate both goods
and services, rather than only goods.3
Indeed, the U.S. “Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation”4 mostly targeted issues with Mexico, according to some
trade experts:
Overall, the U.S. Objectives reflect a tweaking of
NAFTA rather than a full overhaul as Donald Trump
had suggested as a Presidential candidate on the campaign trail. In many cases, the proposed changes echo
the provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(“TPP”) . . . . Further, the U.S. Objectives generally
seem heavily tilted towards addressing perceived imbalances and issues regarding the U.S. trade relationship with Mexico. Many of the provisions relate to

hate-about-trumps-nafta-plans/?utm_term=.77beedb6ebcc; Dave Graham, Mexico Congress Backs Motion Defending NAFTA Dispute Mechanism, U.S. NEWS
(July 26, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-07-26/mexico-congress-backs-motion-defending-nafta-dispute-mechanism.
2
Joshua Partlow, As NAFTA Talks Resume, Mexicans say Trump is Wrong
to Focus on the Deficit, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/as-nafta-talks-resumemexicans-say-trump-is-wrong-to-focus-on-the-deficit/2017/09/01/7a8f12948ccf-11e7-9c53-6a169beb0953_story.html?utm_term=.50f63a2fc716.
3
There is about a $20.5 billion trade deficit with Canada in goods according
to the Canadian government’s calculation, which is the basis for President Trump
claiming that Canada runs a trade surplus with the United States. However, if trade
in services is also included, then the U.S. ran a surplus of only $2.8 billion. John
Carney, Trump’s Quarrel with Canada over Trade Numbers May Point Toward
NAFTA Exit, BREITBART (Mar. 15, 2018), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2018/03/15/trumps-quarrel-with-canada-over-trade-numbers-may-point-toward-nafta-exit/.
4
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF
OBJECTIVES FOR THE NAFTA RENEGOTIATIONS (July 17, 2017) (updated Nov.
2017),
available
at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/Nov%20Objectives%20Update.pdf.
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matters in which there is already a great deal of coherence between the stated U.S. position and current
Canadian law.5
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) expressed dissatisfaction with NAFTA’s DSMs. Yet, for the most part, the DSMs
were retained in the USMCA. This paper contends that the unconstitutionality of the binational panel system for settling disputes
should be more apparent by now than it was when they were first
adopted as part of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
(CUSFTA) and, therefore, should have been rectified in the new
USMCA.
NAFTA was not a treaty, but an executive-congressional agreement. This paper explains how the use of a trade agreement, rather
than a treaty, complicates the constitutional analysis. It does not,
however, directly consider the constitutionality of using a congressional-agreement rather than a treaty.6 Part I of this paper provides
the background for the dispute over the dispute settlement processes.
Next, Part II addresses the constitutionality of NAFTA’s Chapters
11 and 19 dispute settlement mechanisms as they have been carried
over into the USMCA. Finally, in Part III, the paper discusses
whether the USMCA represents an advance of the Rule of Law or
only a Rule of Rules.
I.

The Dispute over Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
As between Canada and the U.S., the real stumbling block in the
NAFTA renegotiations was not a substantive one. It concerned process and enforcement. When disagreements occur about how one
country interprets or enforces the provisions of the agreement, including who will resolve the dispute and how the dispute is to be

5

John W. Boscariol et al, The Art of Trade: Knowing the US Position in
NAFTA Renegotiations (July 20, 2017), http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=7371 (emphasis added).
6
This issue has already been discussed and written about. See, e.g.,
John Yoo, Law as Treaties: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001); Bruce Ackerman and David Golove,
Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1995); Lawrence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously, Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
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handled, NAFTA contained three provisions for resolving those disputes – and the USMCA has largely incorporated those three provisions.
NAFTA’s Chapters 11,7 19,8 and 209 included three distinct
DSMs. The USTR favored changes for all three. Chapter 11 pro-

7
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Chapter 11 of NAFTA established
procedures for settling investment disputes. To bring a claim under Chapter 11, a
party must show it has an investment in the territory of a NAFTA country against
whom the claim is being brought, and the party has to renounce any recourse in
domestic courts of the country against whom the claim is brought. NAFTA art.
1121. A Chapter 11 tribunal is made up of three arbitrators: one appointed by each
of the disputing parties and one appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.
NAFTA art. 1123. Any award made by the tribunal is binding on both the investor
and the respondent party and is enforceable in domestic courts, but the awards
under Chapter 11 are only binding between the disputing parties and with respect
to the particular case. NAFTA art. 1136.
8
Chapter 19 sets out the dispute resolution process for anti-dumping and
countervailing duties cases, allowing parties to request a binational panel review
the case. Panels are comprised of five experts who are chosen from a roster of at
least seventy-five people. Each party involved in the dispute selects two panelists
either from the roster or someone who meets the criteria for roster members. See
NAFTA Annex 1901.2. The fifth panelist is chosen by agreement of the parties.
Chapter 19 panels are required to apply the standard of review of the country
whose agency or law is being appealed. NAFTA art. 1904.3; NAFTA Annex
1911. Decisions by Chapter 19 panels cannot be appealed in domestic courts. An
appeal is only available after the final decision has been issued if 1) a panelist has
violated specific rules of conduct, 2) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or 3) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority, or jurisdiction. NAFTA art. 1904.13; see also Donald McRae and John
Siwiec, NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Success or Failure? (2010), available at
https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/6/2904/21.pdf (This form of
appeal was a continuation of the “extraordinary challenge procedure in the Canada
U.S. Free Trade Agreement). A finding of one of these does not entitle a party to
appeal the decision in a domestic court; instead it would result in the creation of
a new Chapter 19 panel.
9
Chapter 20 of NAFTA governs all disputes related to the interpretation and
application of NAFTA. The resolution process under Chapter 20 first asks parties
to attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution through consultations.
NAFTA art. 2006. If no resolution can be reached, a party may request a meeting
of the Free Trade Commission. The Commission’s sole role is to assist the parties
in reaching an agreement; it will not rule on the dispute. NAFTA art. 2007. If still
no resolution can be reached, a party may request arbitration by a five-member
panel. Chapter 20 of NAFTA establishes that this five-member panel shall be

6
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vided investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) protection for investors from one country making investments in one of the other countries. These types of arbitration provisions, widely adopted since
1959,10 have been generally favored by business interests; opposed
by the populist, left-wing interests;11 and should be of concern to
those protective of state interests. While NAFTA’s ISDS did not appear to be a major focus of the Trump Administration, the USTR
had expressed lack of support for its continuation.12 In the USMCA,
Chapter 11 has become Chapter 14. The dispute settlement mechanism of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 has been retained as between Mexico

made up qualified panelists chosen from a roster of up to thirty individuals who
have been appointed by consensus of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
NAFTA art. 2009. After the panel issues a final report, the parties are to agree on
a resolution that conforms with the panel’s recommendations. However, the findings of the panel are not binding, so the parties do not have to follow the exact
recommendations of the panel. Marc Sher, Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution Under
NAFTA: Fact or Fiction, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 10001 (2003).
10
David Singh Grewal, Investor Protection, National Sovereignty, and the
Rule of Law, AMERICAN AFFAIRS (2018), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/investor-protection-national-sovereignty-rule-law/.
11
Id. (“While Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and other left-wing critics
have made opposition to ISDS a part of their criticism of neoliberal trade policies,
Republicans have tended to waffle on the issue because of its perceived benefits
to big business.”).
12
Steven Trader & Caroline Simson, Lighthizer Defends Skepticism of
NAFTA
Arbitration
to
GOP,
LAW360
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1024510/lighthizer-defends-skepticism-ofnafta-arbitration-to-gop (Appearing in a Congressional hearing, U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer suggested that in place of ISDS, “investors could invoke
the state-to-state dispute resolution mechanism of NAFTA, or that they could incorporate arbitration provisions in their contracts”). But see OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(ISDS) (2015), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds (last visited
Apr. 11, 2018) (“For some critics there is a discomfort that ISDS provides an
additional channel for investors to sue governments, including a belief that all
disputes (even international law disputes) should be resolved in domestic courts.
Others believe that ISDS could put strains on national treasuries or that ISDS
cases are frivolous. Based on our more than two decades of experience with ISDS
under U.S. agreements, we do not share these views. We believe that providing a
neutral international forum to resolve investment disputes under international
law mitigates conflicts and protects our citizens.”) (emphasis added).
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and the United States;13 Canada, however, will be subject to the
ISDS only for “legacy investments.”14
The most contentious DSM, however, is Chapter 10 (formerly
Chapter 19 in NAFTA), which deals with anti-dumping (selling below cost or below the market price in the home or another country)
and countervailing duties (imposing extra tariffs on subsidized, imported goods). The U.S. and Canada were literally at loggerheads as
to the DSM that was formerly contained in Chapter 19.15 The language of NAFTA’s Chapter 19 was carried over almost verbatim to
the USMCA Chapter 10 with a few new additions for digitizing filing and decisions. This paper focuses heavily on Chapter 10.
NAFTA’s Chapter 20, the state-to-state mechanism, was rarely
invoked;16 but the USTR proposed that it be changed from a binding
to a non-binding process.17 Suggesting breaking the binding character of the three DSMs, either through modification or elimination of
the provisions, indicated concerns that the DSMs conflict with U.S.
sovereignty. Chapter 20 is now Chapter 31 in the USMCA and the
binding character was retained despite these concerns.18 This paper
does not focus on the DSM in Chapter 31 (formerly Chapter 20)
because it has not caused significant problems for the United States.

13

Agreement between the United States, the United Mexican States, and
Canada, Nov. 30, 2018, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USMCA].
14
USMCA Annex 14-C. A legacy investment is: “an investment of an investor of another Party in the territory of the Party established or acquired between
January 1, 1994, and the date of termination of NAFTA 1994, and in existence on
the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”
15
Many of the AD/CVD cases between the United States and China have
been about lumber. See, e.g., Opinion and Order of the Extraordinary Challenge
Committee, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada 67,
NAFTA Secretariat File No. ECC2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005).
16
See McRae & Siwiec, supra note 8, at 371–72.
17
U.S. Proposes Non-Binding State-to-State Dispute Settlement Chapter in
NAFTA, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Oct. 15, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/trade/usproposes-non-binding-state-state-dispute-settlement-chapter-nafta
18
USMCA art. 31.
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A. The Conflict over Settling Conflicts
Canada desperately wants to avoid American courts. USMCA’s
Chapter 10 - just like NAFTA’s Chapter 19 - provides that protection. The DSM in Chapter 19 predated NAFTA, having been incorporated at the insistence of Canada in the prior Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Canada. Canada’s prime minister at the
time, Brian Mulroney, was willing to walk away from the CanadaU.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiations if the dispute settlement
mechanism was not included.19 In the NAFTA re-negotiations, Canada insisted that the DSMs, in particular NAFTA’s Chapter 19, were
critical to its trade relations with the United States.20 There was even
speculation that dismantling the trade dispute settlement mechanisms might be a deal breaker for Canada.21 Among the trade cognoscenti in Canada, NAFTA’S Chapter 19 DSM has been considered its “Crown Jewel.”22 As one Canadian expert put it, “That’s
why we sought a free trade agreement in the first place. It’s the dispute resolution process, not low tariffs, that is the jewel in the
NAFTA crown.”23
Opposition to NAFTA’s Chapter 19 DSM came at least from
some U.S. business interests.24 Canada, however, prevailed, and in
the end, the USMCA retained the language of NAFTA’s Chapter 19
almost verbatim. In return, Canada apparently gave ground on dairy
19

Chris Fournier, This Obscure NAFTA Chapter Could be Canada’s Deal
Breaker Again, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-24/this-obscure-nafta-chapter-could-be-canadas-deal-breaker-again.
20
David Ljunggen & Andrea Hopkins, Canada Suggests it Could Quit
NAFTA Talks over Dispute Mechanism, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-nafta-canada/canada-suggests-itcould-quit-nafta-talks-over-dispute-mechanism-idUSKCN1AU1CK.
21
Fournier, supra note 19.
22
Jesse Snyder, The ‘Crown Jewel’ of NAFTA: Why Canada Must Fight to
Retain Dispute Resolution Clause Despite Tough Talks, FINANCIAL POST (Oct.
13, 2017), http://business.financialpost.com/news/the-crown-jewel-of-naftawhy-canada-must-fight-to-retain-dispute-resolution-rule-despite-tough-talks.
23
Id. (quoting CIBC economist Avery Shenfield).
24
See, e.g., Zoltan van Heyningen, Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision Reinforces Doubts About Constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel System,
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (July 2, 2010), https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/recent-us-supreme-court-decision-reinforces-doubtsabout-constitutionalityof-nafta-chapter-19-panel-system-544592012.html.
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issues. That should have been a political win for the Trump Administration, but one that did not come home on election day in Wisconsin.25
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 ISDS was added due to concerns about
Mexico’s history of nationalization. As a result, however, the provision also applied as between Canada and the United States. This was
the first time an ISDS provision became applicable as between two
developed countries. Creative lawyers have attempted to use the situation against the U.S. and Canada, and although they have largely
not been successful, these efforts pointed to a threat to U.S. and Canadian sovereignty. 26
The attempts to use Chapter 11 have involved situations where
a final decision by a state court in the U.S. ends up being reviewed
by a NAFTA ISDS panel.27 State judges, in particular, have been

25

Perhaps partly a result of the mixed response by Wisconsin farmers to the
new USMCA, the GOP did not perform as well as hoped in Wisconsin in the
November 2018 elections. See Hope Kirwan, Wisconsin Farmers Weigh In On
NAFTA Replacement, WISCONSIN PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-farmers-weigh-nafta-replacement;
Monica
Davey, Tony Evers Wins Wisconsin Governor’s Race, Scott Walker Concedes,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/elections-wisconsin-governor-evers-walker.html.
26
Riyaz Dattu & Sonja Pavic, Canada Seeks to Reform NAFTA’s Investorstate
Dispute
Settlement
Chapter,
OSLER
(Aug.
23,
2017),
https://www.osler.com/en/resources/cross-border/2017/canada-seeks-to-reformnafta-s-investor-state-disp (“When the dispute settlement provisions were introduced into NAFTA, it was expected that Mexico would be the country that would
face the largest number of claims under Chapter 11. Instead, Canada has been the
subject of the highest number of investor-state arbitration claims . . . .”); Dan
Healing, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Dispute Mechanism Too Costly for Canada at
$314M, says Report, CBC (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chapter-11-report-ccpa-1.4489102 (reporting that Canada is sued more than twice as
much as Mexico and the U.S.).
27
See, e.g., The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003);
Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
Award (Oct. 11. 2002). See “Loewen” NAFTA Case: Foreign Corporations Unhappy with Domestic Jury Awards in Private Contract Disputes Can Demand
Bailout from Taxpayers, PUBLIC CITIZEN, available at https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/loewen-case-brief-final.pdf (explaining the Loewen
Group case series, in which the Mississippi Supreme Court made a final judgment

10
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quite surprised and very concerned upon discovering that their decisions are reviewable by an international tribunal.28 Though few in
number, claims attempting to expand the reach of Chapter 11 have
required interpretation by NAFTA’s Commission. That Chapter 11
potentially could affect a state’s legal system was clearly not considered by the Congress.29 Chapter 11 raises constitutional questions
about NAFTA’s impact – and now USMCA’s impact – on state and
federal law, in particular judicial independence.30
Chapter 11, thus, has presented a constitutional threat to judicial
independence that should have been quite apparent. American corporate interests, however, clearly favor the ISDS, at least as to Mexico. That is reflected by a statement from Republican senators objecting to a statement by the USTR questioning whether ISDS
should be continued in a renegotiated NAFTA.31
B. Canada’s Complaint
The Canadian concern is directed at the “bias” of U.S. federal
courts, namely in the Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The claim about federal courts
being biased in civil litigation may shock many U.S. lawyers. Certainly, U.S. lawyers representing corporate defendants in civil litigation often complain that courts in certain states are biased in favor
of plaintiffs. Aside from ideological bias among federal judges on
constitutional matters, however, bias in federal civil litigation as between corporations would not seem to be a matter of major concern.
which was reviewed by a NAFTA panel, opening up the possibility that all decisions by U.S. Courts – even the Supreme Court – could be reviewed by and
changed by a NAFTA panel).
28
Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 18, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/18/us/review-of-us-rulings-by-nafta-tribunals-stirs-worries.html.
29
See id. (“‘When we debated NAFTA,’ Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, said in 2002, ‘not a single
word was uttered in discussing Chapter 11. Why? Because we didn’t know how
this provision would play out. No one really knew just how high the stakes would
get.’”).
30
See id. (“‘This is the biggest threat to United States judicial independence
that no one has heard of and even fewer people understand,’ said John D. Echeverria, a law professor at Georgetown University.”). See also infra sec. II.
31
Trader & Simson, supra note 12.
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U.S. lawyers and judges, especially those who lecture around the
world touting the federal judiciary, speak of our Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts as the “crown jewel” of the U.S. Constitution and of bias-free adjudication.
Consider the Canadian perspective, however. In any suit against
the U.S. Department of Commerce in the U.S. Court of International
Trade (CIT), the odds are the U.S. will prevail. That result follows
because the CIT is generally required to defer to the defendantagency’s interpretation of the laws and rules as a result of Congress
having delegated rule-making authority to the agency. While there
are different deference doctrines, the main one used by U.S. federal
courts, known as Chevron deference,32 must be applied by the CIT
as well.
Mittal Canada v. United States,33 a case lost by Canadian challengers, grudgingly explains the standard of review the CIT is forced
to apply:
Mittal has filed a motion for judgment on the agency
record under USCIT Rule 56.1 . . . .Section 706 of
Title 5 requires a reviewing court to ‘‘hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law . . . .’’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). In this case,
the administrative action challenged by Mittal is the
issuance of liquidation instructions directing Customs to assess antidumping duties at the deposit rate
in effect at the time of entry, which was 8.11 percent
for the entries at issue. Normally, ‘‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is,’’ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), but when Congress has
cloaked an administrative agency with interpretive

32

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Another deference doctrine comes from Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944) (holding that an administrative agency’s interpretative rules deserve deference according to their persuasiveness).
33
461 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).
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authority, the federal courts’ authority is concomitantly reduced.34
The court went on to discuss the two types of deference involved
in the case. First, the court gave the Department of Commerce deference under the Chevron doctrine, meaning that because Congress
had delegated authority to Commerce, the court must follow the
agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as the interpretation is
reasonable and not arbitrary.35 Finding that it was a reasonable interpretation, the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation.36 The
court also gave deference to the Department of Commerce for its
interpretation of the agency’s own ambiguous regulation. Under the
Seminole Rock/Auer deference doctrine, U.S. courts will only overturn agency interpretations of their own regulations if the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.37
Here, again, the court found that Commerce’s interpretation was
neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, so it
deferred to the Department of Commerce.38 To Canada, it must appear that the result is foreordained by a process biased against it.
Federal AD/CVD litigation is biased not only against Canadian
and Mexican parties, however. The “bias” extends, as well, to American parties challenging decisions of the Commerce Department and
the International Trade Commission. In the case of Ford Motor Co.
v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security,39 for example, Ford
challenged a decision by the Department of Customs and Border Patrol in the Court of International Trade, but the Court of International
Trade found that the agency decision was not reviewable in the particular instance.40 The bias of deference doctrines in trade litigation
favors the U.S. federal government, and works against private parties, regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign.

34

Id. at 1328 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1328–29.
36
Id. at 1332.
37
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945); see
also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
38
Mittal, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.
39
716 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010).
40
Id.
35
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Moreover, as U.S. lawyers know well, deference doctrines apply
generally in litigation challenging federal agency action. The doctrines do not derive from, or peculiarly relate to, trade dispute litigation. Deference to administrative agencies rests on the dubious assumption that agencies have expertise which justifies Congress giving them great discretion, to which federal courts should defer.41
That the deference doctrines apply generally to all challenges to
agency actions is small comfort to Canadian and Mexican parties in
trade disputes. Naturally, foreign parties will believe U.S. agency
action favors U.S. businesses. After all, in the absence of independent judges, the general tendency of all governments will be to favor
their own businesses. Also, in both trade and other matters addressed
by federal agencies, U.S. corporations do have the advantage of being generally more involved in the administrative processes which
produce the administrative decisions.42
C. The Constitutional Issue of Federal Court Deference to
Administrative Agency Action
The various types of judicial deference to agency action are dictated neither by the Constitution, nor the Administrative Procedure
41

Compare Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.”), with JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 416–19 (2002) (arguing that
judicial deference of agency decisions may amount to post hoc rationalizations of
policy preferences).
42
Potential influence by U.S. corporations differs as between the Department
of Commerce and the International Trade Commission. The Department of Commerce’s role is more political in that it formulates and executes trade policies reflecting the views of the current President. As evident in the change from President Obama to President Trump, those policy preferences can shift quickly and
dramatically. Nevertheless, the Department of Commerce does employ methods
to establish the reasonableness of its decisions. Unlike the Department of Commerce, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) is an “independent”
agency. Moreover, it differs from other agencies by having an equal number of
Republican and Democrat commissioners. Other federal independent agencies
typically have a membership split in favor of the President’s party. As a result,
the USITC operates in a more balanced manner. See UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2017).
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Act.43 As evident from Chevron, they are judicially-created doctrines not based on the Administrative Procedure Act.44 These deference doctrines raise much more fundamental questions with farreaching consequences beyond the AD/CVD DSM.
Professor Philip Hamburger’s 2014 opus, Is Administrative Law
Unlawful? challenges the long-held, foundational assumptions
about Administrative Law. His work begins the chapter on “Deference” by describing how England’s James I demanded that the law
courts defer to prerogative legislation. “The royal claim for deference to prerogative legislation rested on the king’s claim of absolute
power.”45 Hamburger explains how America’s modern Administrative State makes the same “demands for deference to administrative
power.”46
Without the several deference doctrines applicable in the federal
courts, those challenging the interpretation and application of trade
rules in the CIT and the Federal Circuit would stand on equal footing
with the U.S. government. It is rule deference, fact deference, and
interpretation deference, in addition to deference to administrative
orders and warrants, that biases the process.47
Professor Hamburger devastates long-held assumptions among
American lawyers, professors, and judges about the Administrative
law.48 He makes a compelling case that federal courts have abdicated their constitutional duty to interpret the law.49 The process of
appeals from administrative agencies “often has reduced the courts
to extensions of the administrative state, nearly making the court
proceedings yet another layer of administrative hearings.”50 Ham43

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (2012).
See Richard O. Faulk, ’Chevron’ Deference Conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act, WLF LEGAL PULSE (Sept. 18, 2015). It does not appear from
the language of the Administrative Procedure Act that the Court is required to
give deference, and the Court’s decision in Chevron does not mention the Administrative Procedure Act.
45
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 285 (2014).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 312, 319.
48
David E. Bernstein, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, 33 LAW & HIST.
REV. 759, 759–60 (2015) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)).
49
Hamburger, supra note 45, at 283–322.
50
Id. at 303.
44
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burger is convinced – and is convincing – that eventually fundamental constitutional principles about the role of judges will require reconsideration of Supreme Court precedents repeatedly reaffirming
agency-deference.51 The importance of Hamburger’s work is to lay
the intellectual foundation for the re-working of constitutional precedents to reject the judicial deference to administrative agencies.52
Justice Gorsuch is the person most likely to lead a reworking of
the Court’s precedents related to judicial deference to administrative
agencies. During his confirmation process, students of the Court
quickly realized that – unlike his predecessor, Justice Scalia – Justice Gorsuch strongly believes that the deference doctrines are unconstitutional.53 Of course, the change in one vote on the Court on
this issue will not immediately mean that the deference doctrine will
be de-throned anytime soon. While Justice Thomas has long expressed the opinion that the deference doctrine is unconstitutional,54
the necessary additional three votes for a change are lacking at this
time.
A fundamental change in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
judicial deference to administrative agencies could take years to occur. Congress, in considering whether to approve the new USMCA,
however, faces the immediate, practical problem of determining
how to deal with the binational dispute-settlement mechanism
(DSM).

51

Id. at 486–92.
Id. at 498 (“Once it is clear how administrative power revives absolute
power, and how this power conflicts with the nature of American law, liberty, and
society, one can dig into the details of how it violates the Constitution.”).
53
Allan Smith, Trump’s Supreme Court Nominee had his first real day of
grilling - and there’s more to come, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/neil-gorsuch-senate-confirmation-hearing2017-3.
54
See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The ‘judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise
its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.’ . . .
Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them
to abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor
of an agency’s construction. It thus wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative
authority to ‘say what the law is’, and hands it over to the Executive.) (internal
citations removed).
52
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The DSM in Chapter 10 (formerly Chapter 19) is a constitutionally questionable vehicle for getting around a constitutionally questionable practice of judicial deference to administrative agencies
D. Fixing What is Not Working
Even if the agency-deference doctrine is constitutional and even
it continues as to other administrative agencies, it is not working in
the realm of AD/CVD cases. The Supreme Court’s deference doctrines supposedly reflect respect for the intention of Congress in assigning rule-making power to a particular agency55 and the expertise
of the agencies.56
Congress’s intention expressed in NAFTA was that the binational panels apply agency deference.57 In practice, however, that
did not happen. The binational panels may pay “lip service” to the
deference requirement, without following it.58 Once a binational
panel makes a decision, no possibility exists for having U.S. Supreme Court review.59 As to binational panels, the Supreme Court
cannot enforce Chevron or other forms of agency deference. This
remains true in the USMCA.
Binational dispute panels resolve most disputes covered by
USMCA.60 Even if a U.S. party first files in the CIT, another party
55

See, e.g., Mittal, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)
(“[W]hen Congress has cloaked an administrative agency with interpretive authority, the federal courts’ authority is concomitantly reduced.”).
56
See, e.g., id. at 1329 (“As a general matter, Commerce is the ‘master’ of
antidumping law, and where its rules and regulations implement a statutory provision or scheme, it is entitled to considerable deference.”).
57
See Patrick Macrory, NAFTA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in International Trade Dispute Resolution, THE BORDER PAPERS, 4 (Sept. 2002),
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/macrorychapter19.pdf.download (explaining that to prevent the binational panels from creating their own body of law, the
U.S. negotiated to have the panels apply the domestic law of the country where
the decision under challenge was made).
58
See Juscelino F. Colares & John W. Bohn, NAFTA’s Double Standards of
Review, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 199 (2007) (arguing that NAFTA binational panels have shown great deference to Canadian agency determinations,
but have not shown the same deference to applying the standard of review of U.S.
law)
59
See NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1904, § 10.
60
USMCA art. 10; see Macrory, supra note 57, at 6 (“The Chapter 19 procedures have been used extensively, both under the FTA and under the NAFTA.
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can successfully request that the case be heard by a binational
panel.61 USMCA’s binational panels – like NAFTA’s binational
panels – will force U.S. parties into a process that deprives them of
their access to U.S. courts and U.S. law.62
NAFTA required binational panels to apply the law of the country applicable to the dispute,63 but they did not necessarily do so.
The process lacks consistency because there is no “supreme court”
to resolve conflicts among decisions. In place of appeal to a national
court, NAFTA, and now USMCA, provides the possibility for filing
an Extraordinary Challenge,64 which is rarely invoked. Retired U.S.
Court of Appeals Judge Malcolm Wilkey, writing in dissent in a rare
Extraordinary Challenge, has questioned the legitimacy of the process:
If this substitute appellate system had not been intended to achieve similar results in applying U.S.
law, the United States would never have agreed to it.
The United States never contemplated that United
States law would be changed by a binational body. If

Indeed, almost every appeal of a US decision involving Canadian or Mexican imports has been taken to a Chapter 19 panel rather than to the CIT.”).
61
Bhullar v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003) (holding that no statutory exception applied to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NAFTA
binational panels, so because Canada had requested binational panel review of the
contested determinations, the CIT no longer had jurisdiction). This decision was
upheld on review. Bhullar v. United States, 93 Fed. Appx 218 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that “the law ousts jurisdiction in the Court of International Trade to review a final antidumping/countervailing duty order when binational review proceedings have been instituted under NAFTA”). See also Mitsubishi Elec. Indus.
Canada, Inc. v. Brown, 917 F. Supp. 836, 838 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996) (finding that
once a binational panel review has been requested, the binational panel has exclusive jurisdiction).
62
See J. Todd Applegate, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Are Binational Panels
Constitutional?, 3 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 129, 141–44 (1997).
63
NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1904.3; NAFTA, supra note 7, at Annex
1911; USMCA, supra note 13, at art. 10.10.
64
See id. at art. 1904.11-1904.13; USMCA Annex 10-B.3.
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the substitute appellate system does not achieve similar results in applying U.S. law, it may not be long
continued.65
Ideally, a renegotiated NAFTA would have satisfied both the
concerns of Canada about bias in any settlement process and of Congress that U.S. law be followed, where applicable. At least one article suggested making the decisions of binational panels reviewable
by U.S. federal courts as are rulings by federal agencies.66 That,
however, would have only compounded the structural constitutional
problems raised by Professor Hamburger. Chapter 10 binational
panels are not U.S. bodies. Bringing the decisions of non-U.S. panels under the jurisdiction of the federal courts raises even more Article III issues than the NAFTA binational panels already did and
would effectively extend the expansion of the Administrative State.
NAFTA “suspended” the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of
1987 (CUSFTA).67 Some in Canada had argued that its Free Trade
Agreement with the U.S. would once again become effective if
NAFTA had simply been terminated.68 Those who actually thought
this likely had an unwarranted belief.69 Nevertheless, such a belief
reflected the importance that Canada places on preserving the DSM
created in the CUSFTA and continued in NAFTA’s Chapter 19.
To resolve the conflict over NAFTA’s Chapter 19, the U.S.
could have agreed to eliminate the deference doctrines in AD/CVD
cases brought under NAFTA in U.S. courts. Such a change should
65

Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01USA (1994)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
66
See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 62, at 151 (suggesting that although the
Supreme Court has not held that the availability of review by an Article III Court
is required in every case, the Supreme Court’s positive view of appellate review
lends “support to the position that the lack of such appellate review for binational
panel decisions” presents constitutional problems).
67
See Mark Warner, Mark Warner Interviewed about the Fate of the CanadaU.S. FTA if U.S. Withdraws from NAFTA, MAAW LAW (Aug. 14, 2016),
http://www.maawlaw.com/tag/canada-u-s-fta/ (Canada considers the CUSFTA to
be suspended rather than terminated).
68
Alexander Panetta, If NAFTA dies, the old Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement would live on, right? Not so fast Canada, FINANCIAL POST (Oct. 19,
2017),
http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/if-nafta-dies-old-canada-u-s-fta-would-live-on-right-not-so-fast-canada.
69
Id.
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have satisfied any legitimate objection to litigating in U.S. federal
courts. Without such a change, Canada understandably was able to
insist on using binational panels, free from the American courts.
Nevertheless, as explained below,70 the U.S. Constitution has included alienage jurisdiction in federal courts from the outset precisely in order to assure foreigners of a fair judicial process in U.S.
courts.
II.

The Constitutionality of Chapters 10 and 14
The Congress that enacted NAFTA ignored the fact that Chapter
19 was sold as CUSFTA’s “interim” solution that would allow more
time to resolve substantive AD/CVD matters.71 Nevertheless, Chapter 19, with minor changes, was carried over to NAFTA with reliance on its approval as CUSFTA’s Chapter 19.72 Now Chapter 19
has been carried over into the USMCA as Chapter 10 with only a
few changes to update for the digital age.
NAFTA’s ISDS in Chapter 11 effectively subjected state legislation and final state court judgments to review under Chapter 11’s
ISDS. This review process has proven to be a threat to judicial independence.73 When asked about a particular ISDS adjudication which
exemplified the threat, a former U.S. senator who had voted for
NAFTA simply pleaded ignorance: “[W]e didn’t know how this

70

Infra sec. III(A).
See United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1988) (prepared statement by Ms. Jean Anderson, Chief Counsel, U.S. Dept. Of Commerce), at 71 [hereinafter Anderson Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement]
[T]he binational panel system is not, and is not intended to be, a model for future
agreements between the United States and its other trading partners. Its workability stems from the similarity in the U.S. and Canadian legal systems. With that
shared legal tradition as a basis, the panel procedure is simply an interim solution
to a complex issue in an historic agreement with our largest trading partner.
72
See, e.g., Zachary Jacobs, Note: One Thing is Not Like the Other: U.S. Participation in International Tribunals and Why Chapter Nineteen of NAFTA Does
Not Fit, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 868, 897 (2007) (citing to Congressional
hearings on CUSFTA even when discussing Congress’ doubts about the constitutionality of NAFTA).
73
Liptak, supra note 28.
71
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provision would play out.”74 Had Congress inquired, any number of
knowledgeable people could have explained that Chapter 11 “would
play out” as a threat to judicial independence.
In the new USMCA, going forward, Canadian companies will
neither be subject to, nor be able to use offensively, Chapter 14 (formerly Chapter 11). The United States has maintained the ISDS dispute settlement mechanism with regards to Mexico, presumably because American companies fear that Mexico’s new government may
revive the country’s historic practice of nationalization.75
A. Congress’ Failure to Focus on the Constitutionality of
the DSMs in NAFTA
Prior to the vote on NAFTA, the House held a total of 43 committee and subcommittee hearings. The Senate held 17 committee
and subcommittee hearings. Out of this total of 61 hearings, the only
judiciary committee hearing in either House was one by the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and
Refugees. It addressed only immigration-related issues. A hearing
in the House Ways and Means Committee briefly touched on the
general issue of whether NAFTA was giving away U.S sovereignty.76
Congress’ hearings on NAFTA, clearly, did not address the constitutionality of Chapter 19. As carried over to Chapter 19 of
NAFTA, the binational panel system was essentially the same as the
dispute mechanism in the CUSFTA with a few changes.77 The relevant committees apparently assumed they had adequately addressed
74

Id.
See Emily Pickrell, Mexico’s New President Promises More Nationalistic
Energy Approach, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2018), https://www.bna.com/mexicosnew-president-n73014477039/.
76
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Supplemental
Agreements to the NAFTA: Hearing before the House Comm. On Ways and
Means and its Subcomm. On Trade, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
77
See Barbara Bucholtz, Sawing Off the Third Branch: Precluding Judicial
Review of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Assessments under Free Trade
Agreements, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. 175, 192–193 (1995) (explaining that NAFTA
replicates the FTA except in three ways: (1) the parties had to devise a “harmonized system” within seven years, (2) parties have standing to assert that another
party’s domestic law interferes with the NAFTA panel review, (3) failure to apply
the appropriate standard of review is an explicit ground for an Extraordinary Challenge).
75
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the constitutional issues when Congress considered the free trade
agreement between Canada and the U.S. (CUSFTA).78 Thus, Congress’ hearings on carrying-over Chapter 19 into NAFTA focused
less on the legal issues and more on the human rights, environmental, labor, and economic issues that arose with the addition of Mexico as part of the trade agreement.79
Chapter 19 in CUSFTA was originally justified on grounds that
clearly no longer applied once Mexico was included. The argument
in CUSFTA was that Canada and the U.S. have similar legal systems
based on the Common Law.80 NAFTA added Mexico with a very
different legal background. Moreover, despite the similarities in law
between the U.S. and Canada, legal disputes between Canada and
the U.S. have become much more frequent than originally anticipated.81 Changes and actual experience since CUSFTA created binational panels should make it plain that Congress cannot responsibly ignore the DSMs in USMCA.
1.

Constitutional Confusion Caused by Non-Treaty,
Trade Agreements
Had NAFTA been presented as a treaty, whether or not
CUSFTA had been a treaty, the congressional process would have
followed a different route. Assuming that the Senate would still have
approved NAFTA, then the legislative process of implementing it as
a new agreement would have followed.

78

U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) (Rep. Kastenmeier) [hereafter Kastenmeier House CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing] (asking whether the CUSFTA violated
Article III and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by failing to authorize
judicial review or violated the Appointments Clause by having people reviewing
the case who were not appointed by the President). A consensus among the constitutional scholars and lawyers called to testify contended the provision was constitutional. Only a couple scholars and two senators registered their dissents. Bucholtz, supra note 77 at 197 & nn.113 & 114.
79
Bucholtz, supra note 77, at 191.
80
Id. at 179; see also Anderson Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 71.
81
See Patrick Gillespie, America’s NAFTA Nemesis: Canada, not Mexico,
CNN MONEY (Aug. 11, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/news/economy/us-canada-trade/index.html.
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As stated above,82 this article does not directly consider the constitutionality of using a congressional-executive agreement, rather
than a treaty, to create NAFTA. Nevertheless, not using a treaty to
enact NAFTA convoluted the constitutional issues – and the same
issues remain for the USMCA. A treaty itself is Supreme Law of the
Land. Unless a treaty is self-executing,83 however, it requires implementing legislation before it has domestic effect.84
A treaty, insofar as it is an agreement between the United States
and another sovereign, cannot itself be unconstitutional. Unresolved
is the issue of whether a treaty can provide Congress with power it
otherwise does not possess to enact domestic law.85 But, at least as
to non-self-executing treaties, a fairly clear line separates domestic
law from international treaty obligations.
The non-treaty route blurs the line between the domestic and international spheres. Non-treaty agreements are negotiated by the Executive as with a treaty, but the authority of the Executive to do so
is tied to legislation and, if the agreement is approved, is accomplished as a matter of legislation.86 Both the CUSFTA and NAFTA
were followed by implementing legislation, as if they were non-selfexecuting treaties. As legislation, the two trade agreements and their
later implementing legislation were submitted to the two houses of
Congress. A treaty would have been submitted only to the Senate.
The House of Representatives would have a vote only on the implementing legislation. Further blurring the distinction between treaty
and legislation has been the practice of implementing so-called
“fast-track” authority which requires an up-or-down vote, without
amendment, in Congress. The up-or-down vote simulates the vote
on a treaty in the Senate. But unlike a treaty, which requires approval
by two-thirds of the senators, votes in the Senate and the House on
trade “agreements” require only a majority to approve.
82

Supra Introduction.
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
84
Id.
85
See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2093–94 (2014) (finding that
because Congress did not intend to reach local crimes, the Court did not have to
make a decision as to whether the federal implementing legislation for the Convention on Chemical Weapons could properly give the federal government police
powers, which are reserved for the states. The Court does indicate that such action
would be a “stark intrusion into traditional state authority”).
86
19 U.S.C.S. § 3805 (2012).
83
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Like other treaty-avoiding agreements, NAFTA relied on a combination of Congress’ undoubted power over foreign commerce and
the President’s dubious, broad powers to enter non-treaty, executive
agreements with other countries. The practice was invented by the
Roosevelt Administration through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act87 to increase presidential powers over trade88 and to go
around the Senate’s Advice and Consent role, which requires a twothirds majority for approval.89 This novel mixing of Executive and
Legislative powers has raised confusion regarding whether binational panels are operating under international law only and
whether their decisions bind the United States only as a matter of
international law or also as a matter of domestic law.90

87

19 U.S.C.S. § 1351 (2012).
See generally John A. Dearborn, Institutionalizing Presidential Representation in Economic Policymaking: The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934
and the Employment Act of 1946 (2017), available at https://cpb-usw2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/9/1833/files/2017/08/Dearborn-Institutionalizing-Presidential-Representation-in-Economic-Policymaking-August2017-1ho4e3b.pdf (“[T]he act amounted to an attempt to institutionalize presidential representation in tariff making and alter the constitutional structure.”).
89
See Yoo, supra note 6, at 758.
90
Compare United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1988) (testimony by John McGinnis on behalf
of the Department of Justice) [hereinafter McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary
Hearing Statement]
[I]t has also been said that requiring the President to implement binational panel
and committee decisions falls squarely within the historical tradition of United
States reliance on international tribunals to settle claims and boundary disputes.
This argument, based on traditional practice, is misplaced. While international
tribunals’ decisions settling claims and boundary disputes certainly have imposed
obligations on the United States Government as a matter of international law,
those decisions have not, in and of themselves, imposed obligations on the United
States Government as a matter of domestic law,
with the testimony of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld in the same hearing (“I was
astonished at the position presented to you a few minutes ago by the Justice Department. The notion that an international agreement of the United States adopted
by the Congress is not law is to me astonishing.”). The position stated by Mr.
McGinnis was vindicated as to the treaties in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008).
88
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2.

NAFTA: More than a Simple Evolution from
CUSFTA
The Canada-U.S. bilateral trade agreement evolved into NAFTA
through the non-treaty, trade-agreement process with almost no consideration by Congress of its institutional impact on structural constitutional issues. NAFTA (signed in 1992, approved by Congress
in 1993, and effective January 1, 1994) marked the first time the
U.S. participated in a multilateral trade institution. The U.S. had
been a member of The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT), signed in 1947 and effective in 1948 as a multilateral
agreement, but one without institutions. The GATT came about after
the post-World War II failure of countries to agree to the proposed
International Trade Organization (ITO) (due primarily to the refusal
of the U.S Senate)91 at the time they were creating other United Nations-related institutions.92 Following NAFTA, GATT was replaced
in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which like the
proposed ITO, is a permanent institution.
The U.S. Senate failed to approve the ITO because it was concerned that it represented a threat to U.S. Sovereignty.93 The initial
post-World War II enthusiasm for a “New World Order” had been
replaced by concerns related to the Cold War. Only after the fall of
the Soviet Union did calls for a “New World Order” resurface. In
between the effective dates of CUSFTA (1988) and NAFTA (1994),
the Soviet Union officially fell apart in 1991.
Congress failed to understand that other language in NAFTA
meant that Chapter 19 constituted more than a simple carry-over
from the DSM in CUSFTA. The movement from CUSFTA to

91

Ivan D. Trofimov, The Failure of the International Trade Organization
(ITO): A Policy Entrepreneurship Perspective, 5 JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND LAW
1 (2012), available at http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/15291/10355.
92
See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, From the GATT to the WTO:
A Brief Overview, guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=363556&p=4108235 (last
visited Apr. 11, 2018) (The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference created the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and laid the foundations for the International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
93
TRANSFORMATIONS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
MULTINATIONALS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 38 (Sushil Vachani ed., 2006).
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NAFTA institutionalized the regional governance of trade. The binational DSM in the CUSFTA introduced what was then a novel
element of trade governance. Thereafter, NAFTA innovated further
in the realm of DSMs with Chapter 11. For the first time, Chapter
11 created an Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) that could
be applied between two developed countries, i.e., the United States
and Canada. The reason for doing so, however, involved the participation of Mexico in NAFTA.94 Then, the AD/CVD binational
DSM, originally justified in the CUSFTA on the basis of the common legal systems of the US and Canada, was expanded to include
the very different, civil-law based system of Mexico and the possibility of all the civil-law countries of Latin America joining through
accession.
Although it did not happen, NAFTA was created with a view to
incorporating all of the countries in the Western hemisphere.95 In
1994, just as NAFTA became effective, trade ministers from most
of the countries in the Americas met in Miami to discuss expanding
NAFTA to a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).96 NAFTA’s
text anticipated this development by including an accession clause,
which would allow other countries to join NAFTA.97 Early on, political barriers prevented the anticipated accession of Chile.98 Since
then, instead of accessions, the U.S. has been negotiating bilateral

94
Isidro Morales, The Governance of Global Issues Through Regionalism:
NAFTA as an Interface Between Multilateral and North-South Policies (2006),
available at project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nakagawa/members/papers/1(5)Morales.final.pdf.
95
See generally M. Jean Anderson, Implications of NAFTA’s Extension to
Chile and Other Countries – A U.S. View, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 227 (1997), available
at http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol23/iss/28.
96
Brandy A. Bayer, Expansion of NAFTA: Issues and Obstacles Regarding
Accession by Latin American States and Associations, 26 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 615 (1997) (“In December of 1994 the leaders of thirty-four nations of the
Western Hemisphere met at the Summit of the Americas. This conference resulted
in a unanimous call for the creation of a “Free Trade Area of the Americas”
(FTAA) by the year 2005.”).
97
NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 2204.
98
Bayer, supra note 96, at 634–35.
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treaties with a number of countries in Latin America.99 The U.S. has
definite advantages in bilateral trade agreements.100
While the USTR, at the time, assured a member of Congress that
NAFTA represented no infringement on U.S. sovereignty, he did
not address the constitutional issues of the DSMs.101 In the short
time under the CUSFTA, a bilateral treaty between two developed
countries, major constitutional issues may not have been apparent to
those not focused on constitutional law. The evolution of trade
agreements, however, has been towards greater harmonization of
law, which certainly can be a threat to sovereignty due to enforcement mechanisms such as the binational panels.
It is well to emphasize the premise upon which Chapter 19 of
CUSFTA had been sold: it was to be only an “interim” solution between two countries having common-law legal systems.102 The addition of Mexico and potentially many other civil-law countries represented a significant change. Chapter 11 was added to NAFTA due
to the concern about Mexico’s history of expropriations, but limiting
Mexico’s sovereignty necessarily also limited U.S. sovereignty in a
reciprocal way. Nevertheless, Congress gave virtually no consideration to the serious constitutional issues raised by the DSMs in
NAFTA.
B. Unresolved Constitutional Issues
Relatively few cases have been filed raising constitutional questions about NAFTA. One circuit court did issue a lengthy opinion
ruling that Congress constitutionally used its power over foreign
commerce to enact NAFTA and did not need to enter a treaty under
99

See Sander Levin et al, Free Trade Agreements with Latin America: A Test
of Globalization, CARNEGIE-TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY (Mar. 14,
2006), http://carnegietsinghua.org/2006/03/14/free-trade-agreements-with-latinamerica-test-of-globalization (noting the United States had entered into 10 bilateral free trade agreements with Latin American countries by 2006).
100
See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION (2000).
101
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Supplemental
Agreements to the NAFTA: Hearing before the House Comm. On Ways and
Means and its Subcomm. On Trade, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony by
Ambassador Michael Kantor).
102
See Anderson Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note
71.
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the Constitution treaty provision.103 But, Congress has made it particularly difficult to challenge the constitutionality of the DSMs by
restricting the jurisdiction over any such challenge to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court.104 Several challenges
have been filed, but none has resulted in a decision on the merits.105
1.
Chapter 14 (Formerly Chapter 11)
As already indicated, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 was adopted without
receiving scrutiny by Congress.106 The federal courts have also not
scrutinized the constitutionality of Chapter 11’s DSM.107 Furthermore, Chapter 11 has rarely been the subject of commentary concerning its impact on the U.S. federal system.
Specifically, consideration has not been given to the question of
ultimate responsibility if an ISDS panel rules against a U.S. state.
Although no such ruling has come about, if such decision did occur,
the question would be one of determining ultimate responsibility.
That is to say, should the U.S. government be responsible for a
state’s violation of NAFTA.108 Under USMCA’s Chapter 14, which
will not apply to new investments involving Canada, such a ruling
is much less likely. Nevertheless, if such a panel result should occur
under USMCA’s Chapter 14, serious federalism issues would
arise.109
On the basis of USMCA, should Congress enact further legislation that would require a violating state to pay any ruling against the
103

Made in the U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.

2001).
104

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A) (2012).
See, e.g., Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United State, 471 F.3d 1329
(2006) (dismissing the complaint, which alleged that the binational panel of
NAFTA violated the Constitution, for lack of jurisdiction).
106
See Liptak, supra note 28.
107
U.S. Federal Courts have heard NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, but have not
addressed the constitutionality of Chapter 11.
108
See Healing, supra note 26 (The United States has won all the Chapter 11
cases brought against it).
109
The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim, available at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3922.pdf (“Article 105 of
NAFTA requires the United States to ensure that its state governments comply
with the terms of NAFTA . . . .Article 1105 of NAFTA, requires the United States
to provide ‘full protection and security’ to investments of foreign investors, including ‘full protection and security’ against third party misconduct.”).
105
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United States? How would that square with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the 11th Amendment and the residual sovereignty
of the states? Interestingly, Chapter 11 posed similar problems for
the federal system of Canada, about which there has been some
scholarly comment110 – and now Canada is not bound by the ISDS
going forward under the USMCA.
2.
Separation of Powers and Binational Panels
The major constitutional issues addressed in congressional hearings on CUSFTA’s Chapter 19 and later in scholarly commentary
on NAFTA’s Chapter 19 have been Article II’s Appointments
Clause, Article III jurisdiction, Due Process and Jury Trial rights, as
well as some references to Separation of Powers.111 The same constitutional issues exist with the USMCA’s Chapter 10 because no
substantive changes were made to the DSM. In a structural approach
to constitutionality, Separation of Powers would rank as fundamental, with Article II (The Appointments Clause) and Article III (removal of federal court jurisdiction) being considered under the general principle of Separation of Powers. Due Process and Jury Trial
rights would become moot if the binational DSM violates Article
III.
Before the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Separation of Powers
was understood by both the Federalists and the Antifederalists to be
the fundamental protection for liberty.112 Like British judges, federal
judges are independent in order to administer due process and preside over cases as neutral actors. Unlike British judges, however,
this independence was the necessary condition protecting Article III
judges in the exercise of their authority and obligation not to enforce
legislation which contravenes the Constitution.113
Since the Supreme Court ruled on the Watergate tapes in the
Nixon case,114 greater attention has been given to separation of powers. The Court had handed down a number of important separation

110
See Rajeeve Thakur, Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the Provinces- Will the
Constitutional Question Be Asked?, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 251 (2012).
111
Bucholtz, supra note 77, at 197.
112
See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison).
113
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
114
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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of powers cases, some of which bear on the Article II and III issues
raised by Chapter 10.
a. Article II—The Appointments Clause
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
CUSFTA, the Justice Department representative expressed the opinion that the binational DSM did not pose a problem under Article III
of the Constitution.115 Based on Buckley v. Valeo,116 however, DOJ
thought that the binational panels, as laid out in the agreement, did
pose a constitutional problem under the Appointments Clause. The
decisions of the binational panels could properly bind the U.S. as a
matter of international law. As a matter of domestic law, however,
the binational panels could not be binding because the decisionmakers were not appointed consistent with the Constitution.
If decisions of the binational panels were automatically binding
as domestic law of the U.S., that would conflict with the Appointments Clause because the members of the binational panel would
not have been appointed in conformity with the Appointments
Clause.117 As a way of curing the problem, DOJ advised that the
implementing legislation authorize the President to direct the appropriate agencies to enforce domestically the international obligations
of the United States.118 The DOJ testimony suggested that the President would have to have the discretion to approve or not, but that

115

McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 90.
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding, on one of the several issues in the case, that
the members of the Federal Election Commission must be appointed by the President). Mr. McGinnis also cited Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) on the
Appointments Clause. McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement,
supra note 90.
117
U.S. CONST. art II.
118
McGinnis Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 90.
The President is authorized to direct the administering authority, the Commission,
and the U.S. customs service, as appropriate, to take necessary and appropriate
action to implement the international obligations of the U.S. under Article 1904
of the Agreement pursuant to a final decision of a binational panel or extraordinary challenge committee. Any action taken under this authority shall not be subject to judicial review, and no U.S. court shall have power to review the determinations on any question of law or fact by an action in the nature of mandamus or
otherwise.
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the expectation would be that he would approve virtually all of
them.119
The Department of Justice was not proposing that binational
panel members be appointed by the president. It was attempting to
avoid the situation—which has in fact resulted—that binational panels composed of non-officers of the U.S. are issuing decisions which
are binding domestically. Congress did not adopt the DOJ proposal
or otherwise directly address the Article II problem. Instead, the implementing legislation for both CUSFTA and NAFTA provided
that, in the event that NAFTA’s Chapter 19 was held unconstitutional in relation to this issue, the President was authorized to adopt
panel decisions as his own.120 Congress also made it very difficult
to litigate a constitutional challenge to Chapter 19.121 The constitutional problem with Chapter 19 remains in USMCA’s Chapter 10.
From Buckley to NLRB v. Canning,122 the Supreme Court has
dealt with a series of constitutional123 challenges questioning Congress’s power to control the Executive Branch.124 All but Canning
have involved attempts by Congress to limit the president’s appointment or removal authority. Although the results in the cases may not
be consistent, the various opinions—whether a majority, dissent, or
concurrence—consistently turn on whether they do or do not emphasize the importance of the principle of separation of powers. The
opinions stressing separation of powers did, or would, rule against
the particular legislation.
The separation of powers issue with regards to the binational
panels differs in that the president’s representatives accepted the
DSM and presented it to Congress. Rather than Congress attempting
119

Id.
19 U.S.C. § 1615(g)(7) (2012).
121
Jurisdiction over any constitutional challenge of the NAFTA DSMs is restricted to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(g)(4)(A) (2006).
122
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
123
As opposed to a question about a statutory interpretation question regarding the president’s power to fill vacancies. See, e.g., NLRB v. SW General, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 929 (2017).
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Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988); Freytag v. Comm. Of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Edmond v.
U.S., 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Control Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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to infringe on presidential power, the executive-legislative agreement and fast-track processes enhance the power of the president.
That this novel approach was agreeable to both the president and
Congress does not dispense with a separation of powers issue, however.
Concurring in Canning, Justice Scalia emphasized the role of
separation of powers in protecting liberty. “Since the separation of
powers exists for the protection of individual liberty, its vitality does
not depend on whether the encroached-upon branch approves the
encroachment.”125 Among the cases Justice Scalia cited is Free Enterprise Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,126 a case
which provides support for the argument that NAFTA’s Chapter 19
violated the Appointments Clause.
The binational panels created a new Appointments Clause question just as Free Enterprise Fund had. In Free Enterprise Fund, the
Court ruled that “dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board
members contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers.”127
The Court has long upheld the ability of Congress to commit the
initial adjudication of many matters to an Executive Branch agency
and to restrict the President’s ability to remove the appointed officers. Free Enterprise Fund, however, refused to uphold an extension
of such restrictions to an officer further removed from the president.
With the binational panels, the president neither appoints nor can
remove members on the panels, whose decisions will be binding as
domestic law. In Free Enterprise Fund, the dual delegation occurred
wholly within the structure of the federal government. The binational panels involve a double-delegation which ends outside the
federal government in a non-governmental binational panel.128
125

NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations removed) (citing Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 497); see also Freytag
v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 879–80 (1991); Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252,
276–277 (1991).
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561 U. S. 477 (2010).
127
Id. at 492.
128
Chapter 19 binational panels are not part of a federal administrative
agency. The agreements explicitly provide that panel members are not members
of the government. NAFTA Annex 1901.2(1) (“Candidates shall not be affiliated
with a Party, and in no event shall a candidate take instructions from a Party.”).
What occurs is a double delegation of power. Congress delegates power to the
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The Court’s opinion in Free Enterprise Fund is narrowed to declaring the issue of dual for-cause removal a violation of separation
of powers. Nevertheless, it is built on some broad language, such as
the following, which is easily applied to the binational panels.
A key “constitutional means” vested in the President—perhaps
the key means—was “the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.” And while a government of
“opposite and rival interests” may sometimes inhibit the smooth
functioning of administration, “[t]he Framers recognized that, in the
long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical
to preserving liberty . . . .”129
Calls to abandon those protections in light of “the era’s perceived necessity,” are not unusual. Nor is the argument from bureaucratic expertise limited only to the field of accounting. The failures
of accounting regulation may be a “pressing national problem,” but
“a judiciary that licensed extraconstitutional government with each
issue of comparable gravity would, in the long run, be far worse.”130
b. Article III: Withdrawing Jurisdiction from U.S.
Courts
Unlike the Free Enterprise Fund decision, Chapter 10’s binational panels also raise Article III issues. The members of the binational panels are not appointed by the president, but they exercise
adjudicative power like a federal agency. Yet, their administrativeagency-like decisions are not generally reviewable by any Article
III court.131 Private parties to a binational panel cannot challenge the
conduct or the constitutionality of the panel process. Only one of the
countries can file an “Extraordinary Challenge” to a particular panel.
As indicated by the choice of the word “Extraordinary,” this “appeal” has been extremely rare. Effectively, a private party does not,

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to select individuals to be on the roster to
serve on the NAFTA binational panels. Congress further delegated power by giving oversight of these panels to a Secretariat. United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1851 Sec. 405(e); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 107 Stat. 2057 Sec. 105(a).
129
Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 480 (internal citations removed).
130
Id. at 501 (internal citations removed).
131
NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1904.
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in practice, even benefit indirectly by this rarely used appeal. Furthermore, judicial review of the results of the binational panels is
generally prohibited. In an attempt to avoid the claim that Congress
has violated separation of powers by precluding constitutional review, the statue limits jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to
NAFTA to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.132
The statute also restricts standing beyond the Article III requirement.133
1) International versus Domestic Law
At the time of CUSFTA, the Justice Department, and others rejecting the Article III challenges to the binational panels, took the
position that the history of U.S. participation in international tribunals and boundary disputes meant that there was no Article III objection to the binational panels. As the Justice Department pointed
out, however, those tribunals only settled U.S. obligations as a matter of international law,134 which was the basis for its concerns, discussed above, about the Appointments Clause.135
Given that Congress failed to correct the Appointments Clause
problem, the result is that international binational panels are making
decisions that have the effect of binding domestic law in the United
States and are not subject to judicial review. There is no precedent
suggesting that such an arrangement can possibly comport with our
Constitution.
Congress’s creation of the binational panels has rightly been referred to, repeatedly, as “unique” because to require U.S. citizens to
go to an international body in order to assert claims under U.S. law
would previously have been unthinkable.
In CUSFTA, the political branches agreed to a power-sharing
arrangement with Canada that took AD/CVD matters away from the
132

19 U.S.C.A. s 1516a(g)(4)(A).
American Coalition for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (“Under the NAFTA Act, 19 U.S.C.A. s 1516a(g)(4)(C) (Supp. 1997),
‘an interested party’ that participated in a binational review panel proceeding may
commence such a constitutional challenge ‘within 30 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register of notice that binational panel review has been completed.’”).
134
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jurisdiction of the CIT, an article III court. The Congress need not
have made the CIT an Article III court with jurisdiction over
AD/CVD cases. For a long period, AD/CVD disputes did not go to
an Article III court.136 In the past, AD/CVD matters were handled
within the Executive branch.
Although it did not have to, Congress later created the CIT as an
Article III court and gave jurisdiction over AD/CVD matters. When
CUSFTA came along, Congress removed jurisdiction from CIT. But
it did not simply legislate taking away CIT jurisdiction and, for example, returning to a previous way of handling AD/CVD matters.
Instead, it sent these matters to an international body. That choice
was not one that is constitutionally permissible.
2) Exceptions to Article III
The Supreme Court has recognized certain exceptions which allow Congress to commit adjudication to non-Article III courts.
These fall into two general categories: So-called “public rights” legislative courts and adjuncts to Article III courts.137 “Public rights”
matters, which Congress could have handled itself without involvement of courts, are one of the classes of disputes that have been allowed to be placed in legislative courts.138 As generally defined, a
“public rights” dispute must involve the federal government as a
party.139 Accordingly, AD/CVD would fall under the public rights
doctrine.
The Supreme Court’s cases on the relationship between legislative courts and Article III courts has been anything but clear and
consistent. In 1982, the Supreme Court handed down the Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. decision,140 a plurality opinion which held that Congress could not assign broad adjudicative powers to non-Article III bankruptcy judges. The case ap-
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See generally, Andrew Nolan and Richard M. Thompson, Congressional
Power to Create Federal Courts: A Legal Review, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
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peared that it might be a landmark case, highly restrictive of exceptions to Article III jurisdiction. The Court identified only three categories of cases where it was permissible to assign disputes to nonArticle III judges.141
Between 1982 and the CUSFTA hearings in 1988, however, a
substantial majority of the Court took a much more functional approach in two cases, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products142 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,143
and refused to extend Northern Pipeline. At that point, the Congress
may have thought the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence indicated a
general willingness to uphold exceptions to Article III jurisdiction
that Congress considered “necessary and proper.”
In 1989, after the CUSFTA hearings, Justice Brennan wrote a
majority opinion seemingly giving new life to Northern Pipeline.144
Since then, the Court has addressed Article III issues in the context
of bankruptcy in two important decisions on the ability of Congress
to avoid Article III courts. In Stern v. Marshall145 (holding the Bankruptcy Court had statutory authority, but not constitutional authority) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif146 (holding
Article III is not violated when parties knowingly and voluntarily
consent to a bankruptcy court). As the unanimous opinion in Wellness International began:
Congress’ efforts to align the responsibilities of nonArticle III judges with the boundaries set by the Constitution have not always been successful. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
and more recently in Stern, this Court held that Congress violated Article III by authorizing bankruptcy
judges to decide certain claims for which litigants are
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constitutionally entitled to an Article III adjudication.147
3) Exceptions to Article III Do Not Include Giving
Jurisdiction to an International Body
Although Congress has broad authority in legislating on all
kinds of matters, the Constitution constrains how it does so. INS v.
Chadha,148 for example, involves congressional legislation that created a deportation process for aliens and also gave the Immigration
and Naturalization Service power to suspend deportations under certain circumstances. But Congress also reserved to itself a “legislative veto” which could be exercised if members of one House of
Congress disagreed with a particular decision suspending a deportation. Having given the power to an Executive agency, Congress
could not take away that power without going through the constitutionally mandated process for enacting and amending laws.
Consistent with Separation of Powers and Article III, Congress
has power to exercise a degree of control over when and where U.S.
citizens have access to federal courts. Article III leaves to Congress
discretion whether to create lower federal courts and which ones.149
Had Congress not created any lower federal courts, almost all litigation would have come initially through state courts. Congress has
long regulated the minimum amount in controversy required to file
in federal court and the ability to remove cases from state court.150
The Supreme Court has also upheld the power of Congress to
keep U.S. citizens out of both state and federal courts under the Federal Arbitration Act,151 but only if the parties “consent” in some
form to binding arbitration. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rebuffed state attempts to legislate around the Federal Arbitration
Act.152 Analogies between consensual arbitration and the binational
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panels fail, however, because all AD/CVD challenges must go to the
binational panels, regardless of the parties’ consent.
In certain situations, the disputants’ consent does not matter. The
Court has allowed Congress to require citizens and others—without
their consent—to go first through the administrative agency process.
Although they are deprived (Hamburger would argue, unconstitutionally153), of the right to jury trial, they are not completely barred
from access to an Article III court because they are able to appeal to
an Article III court.154 The Executive can send U.S. citizens for trial
in another country in which the accused is alleged to have committed a crime, but doing so is based on the Constitution’s Extradition
Clause,155 an extradition treaty with the other country, and the right
to an extradition hearing in federal court.156 In none of these situations is access to at least one federal court precluded.
Neither Congress nor the President, however, can constitutionally force a U.S. citizen to submit to adjudication by a non-U.S. process of adjudication for acts occurring within the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Although a criminal case, Reid v. Covert is strong authority for
the proposition that U.S. citizens cannot be forced into a non-U.S.
adjudication for actions taken under U.S. jurisdiction.157
As the Customs and International Trade Association Bar stated
in its submission against the binational panels,
We are not aware of any precedent where the United
States has statutorily agreed to force its citizens or
those entitled to the protection of its laws to go to a
binational panel to construe United States laws and
Federal agencies actions with the ultimate determination of those rights or obligations under United
States statutes in that binational panel.158
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Despite what might be termed a “flexible” view of separation of
powers, the majority opinion in Wellness International Network provides support for the view that Congress cannot force parties into
binational panels without their consent. The opinion clearly notes
that consent is required for adjudication before a non-Article III
court.
In sum, the cases in which this Court has found a violation of a litigant’s right to an Article III decisionmaker have involved an objecting defendant
forced to litigate involuntarily before a non-Article
III court. The Court has never done what Sharif and
the principal dissent would have us do – hold that a
litigant who has the right to an Article III court may
not waive that right through his consent.159
III. The Constitutional Tension Between Sovereignty and
Harmonization of Trade Law
Harmonization of commercial law generally is a worthwhile endeavor. Such harmonization certainly facilitates trade. Voluntary
adoption of the U.C.C. by all the states in the U.S. demonstrates that
the desire for increased trade can produce a high degree of harmonization of commercial law. Due to some variations among the
states, the harmonization brought about by the U.C.C. is not perfect.
Moreover, state and federal courts interpret the law as adopted in
each particular state, which may or may not conform to the interpretation of the same provision in other states. To achieve perfect harmonization, the U.C.C. would have to be a federal law and, therefore, subject to authoritative interpretation by the Supreme Court,
which current precedent precludes.160
The U.C.C. has served as a model for international model laws,
including Article 9’s influence on the Organization of American
159

Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1947 (2015).
The creation of the U.S.C. as a model law for the states came about after
the Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), over-ruled
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), and stated that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local
in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
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States model law and, in turn, Mexico’s law on secured lending.161
This work has been led by the National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade (NLCIFT), a private non-profit organization, which
has been engaged in harmonization and trade promotion efforts
since 1992.162 NLCIFT’s work supported implementation of
NAFTA and, later, the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA).163 Working with private parties, the U.S. State Department, USAID, and various countries in the Americas, NLCIFT has
assisted a number of countries in the Americas to draft commercial
law-reform legislation. NLCIFT has also encouraged and trained
private parties voluntarily to use arbitration as an alternative dispute
mechanism. Most importantly, this process involves voluntary actions by the various governments; the governments do not give up
their sovereign right to legislate and adjudicate.
The U.C.C. is compatible with the federal form of the United
States, in which states retain residual sovereignty over much of their
law. The Constitution’s structure encourages, but does not itself
force, harmonization. It leaves to Congress the power to decide
whether and how much of commercial law to harmonize. The text
of the Constitution itself (as opposed to the Court’s invention of the
Dormant Commerce Clause) lays down the few basic principles necessary to facilitate trade and creates the institutional process for legislating and enforcing the rules, but leaves substantive matters to the
congressional process.
The Constitution modified the federal form from what we now
call confederalism to federalism. Among other problems, delegates
came to the Constitutional Convention to deal with disruptions in
trade and commerce caused by various states. The Philadelphia Con-
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vention followed a year after the failure of the Annapolis Convention in 1786, which had been called to consider commercial issues.
The Articles of Confederation did provide for the free movement of
commerce from one state to another and provide citizens of each
state the privilege of trading in other states on the same terms as
citizens of those states.164 Each state, however, retained its full sovereignty.165 The United States then had a Congress, but no executive
or federal judiciary to enforce the Articles. The structure created by
the Constitution would free up the flow of trade and commerce.
A. How the Constitution Frees Commerce Among the
States
The Constitution frees up the flow of commerce even without
Congress passing legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Article I, Section 10 does much to prevent states from interfering with
the movement of commerce from one state to others.166 It prohibits
states from 1) manipulating money and impairing contract rights; 2)
entering treaties, alliances or confederations, which would include
164

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV,
the free inhabitants of each of these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State
shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions,
and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . . .
165
Id. at art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).
166
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10
No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of
marque and
reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of
nobility.
No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s
inspection laws: and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any state
on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and
all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.
No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep
troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with
another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded,
or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
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trade agreements with each other or foreign nations; and 3) imposing
imposts or duties (tariffs) on imports or exports, except as absolutely
necessary for executing their inspection law and except as allowed
and controlled by Congress.
Other parts of Article I, Section 10 deal with war. As discussed
early in The Federalist,167 guarding against the potential for war
with other countries and between states is a major motivator for creating “a more perfect Union.”168 The Federalist understands that
commercial rivalries between countries can be a common cause for
war.169 A superintending power over commerce among the states
benefits not only the economic well-being of the country, but provides the tax revenue for a strong Union to defend against commercial and military aggression.
The Constitution does not simply give an existing government
more power; no central government existed prior to the Constitution.
A treaty/confederation is not a government, as The Federalist explains.170 For the first time, the Constitution created a government
for the United States. The federal government is a power that can
act directly on citizens, as long as it does so within its enumerated
powers. In confederations, like our Articles of Confederation and
the European Union, the central power can only act on the constituent states, not directly on citizens.171 Compare the difference on
taxes: under the Articles, Congress could not tax directly but had to
request funds from the states. For better or worse, the federal government directly imposes and collects taxes on individuals and businesses.
To move from the Confederation to a government, the Constitution added what the Articles lacked: executive power vested in a
president and judicial power vested in a supreme court “and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”172 The establishment of the system of lower federal
courts was controversial. Madison, who wanted lower courts to be
established in the Constitution, had to compromise by leaving it to
167
168
169
170
171
172

THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2-8.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
See id.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
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Congress. Fortunately, the first Congress established some lower
federal courts.173
Creation of the lower federal courts, along with diversity jurisdiction, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause174 was intended
to protect and facilitate commerce among the states.175 Some lawyers and judges have questioned the continued need for diversity
jurisdiction.176 They apparently think that the proper role for federal
courts is to focus primarily on issues under the Bill of Rights, rather
than on commercial matters which fall into federal courts simply
because the parties are citizens of different states.
The Framers focused considerable attention on the conflicts
among competing factions –notably those based on different economic interests such as debtors and creditors.177 They had witnessed
the populist passions of debtor-dominated state politics. They, therefore, designed a modern federal republic that would avoid the fatal
flaws of the ancient republics.178 That meant structuring the government on the pillars of separation of powers and federalism.179 Issues
of federalism and separation of powers involving trade and commerce were the basis for some of the most important and controversial cases of the 19th century.180
Diversity jurisdiction, along with the related alienage jurisdiction,181 has been key to the commercial success of the United States.
Access to lower federal courts, with Article III judges, has meant
that out-of-state and out-of-country investors could have confidence
of being judged in a neutral forum. Even with juries drawn from the
173

An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States (more commonly called the Judiciary Act of 1789), available at https://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=196.
174
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
175
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
176
See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. 119 (2003).
177
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
178
See id.
179
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
180
See John Marshall and the Bank Case: McCulloch v. Maryland,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION 4 (2012), available at http://www.crfusa.org/images/pdf/JohnMarshallandthBankCase.pdf (explaining the controversy
surrounding the decision).
181
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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local population, Article III courts minimize the opportunities for
getting “home-cooked” in a state court deferential to interests of local voters. Unfortunately, some federal judges do not appreciate that
their existence greatly reduces the risks of doing business throughout the United States.182
The integrity of any country’s courts is not merely a domestic
issue; it affects the attractiveness of a country to foreign investment.
Affording aliens access to federal courts, however, not only facilitates trade. The lower federal courts are necessary to assure foreigners more generally that they will receive fair treatment. The Federalist explains the reasons, including avoiding war, why “the federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”183
It was not long after adoption of the Constitution that equal treatment for aliens as to jurisdiction was put to a major test. The dispute
ultimately produced the famous 1816 case of Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee,184 which confirmed the authority of the Supreme Court to
review final judgments of state courts on issues interpreting treaties
and the Constitution. The case, however, began in 1794 as a dispute
over conflicting claims to lands, arising because Virginia had enacted a statute allowing confiscation of Loyalist property. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the confiscation, but the Supreme Court
disagreed in Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee (1813).185 It held
that the matter fell within the terms of the Jay Treaty.
182

Investors and businesses generally decide where to invest or locate their
businesses based on an assessment of the opportunities and risks of particular locations. One of those risks relates to the court system. In the U.S., certain state
court systems are viewed as negative factors, but the ability to access a federal
court minimizes the risk. Overall, the U.S. civil justice system is viewed as consistent with the Rule of Law.
183
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton)
The peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. The union
will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.
And the responsibility for an injury, ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty
of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts,
is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow, that the federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other
countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public
faith, than to the security of the public tranquility. (emphasis added).
184
14 U.S. 304 (1816).
185
11 U.S. 603 (1813).
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What has generally separated the U.S. legal system from many
countries has been its equal access for, and fair treatment of, foreign
parties in federal court.186 Foreign parties often prefer to litigate in
the U.S. federal court system, rather than in their home-country
courts. On the other hand, American corporations contracting with
foreign parties often specify that any litigation will occur in a U.S.
court or that any disputes will be resolved through arbitration.
Among other reasons, corporations choose to do so due to the corruption of many court systems around the world.
B. NAFTA/USMCA and Harmonization: The Triumph of
Hope over Sovereignty?
Efforts at harmonization and unification of commercial law have
been developing since the nineteenth century.187 The success of the
United States in moving from a confederation to a federal-state Constitution to create a largely free-trade, internal market had some impact on this movement. Since the 1980’s, the efforts at harmonization and unification have increased through bilateral and regional
trade agreements.188 They have encouraged visions of ever expanding harmonization. At least prior to recent political developments in
the West, those hoping for global harmonization seemed to be riding
the wave of history.
Complete harmonization of trade law, however, is an extremely
complicated, and possibly futile, exercise.189 Multilateral trade
agreements require complex harmonization of the trade-related laws
of all countries involved.190 Recall that the binational panel provision was supposed to be an “interim” solution in order to allow the

186

See CREDENDO, https://www.credendo.com/country_risk/united-states
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (evaluating countries according to business risks and
scoring the United States as low risk).
187
JUNJI NAKAGAWA, INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF ECONOMIC
REGULATION (2011).
188
Id.
189
See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, University of Virginia School of Law Legal Studies
Working Papers Series (1999), available at www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/ricerche/dottorati/allegati/1999_stephan.pdf.
190
See Craig L. Jackson, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and Legal Harmonization, ASIL Insights (June 14, 1996), available at
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U.S. and Canada more time to harmonize their AD/CVD laws.191
That harmonization on one area of law between only two countries
did not occur. Instead, the interim solution of the binational panels
carried forward into NAFTA and now into USMCA.
The Trade Act of 1974 authorized the President “to harmonize,
reduce or eliminate barriers” which are deemed to place an undue
burden on our trade with other nations.192 Harmonization of commercial law is a matter of degree, however. It need not be as comprehensive as that of the European Union, which aims at unification.
Those driving ever-more comprehensive harmonization are economists and multinational corporations. Neither pay much, if any attention, to law in general or to the Constitution in particular.
Congress does not possess the power to regulate commerce
among foreign nations. That would be a superintending power. Congress does have a superintending power to regulate commerce
among the states. The original meaning of “to regulate” is “to make
regular”193 and “to make regular” is a synonym for “harmonize.”194
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to “make
regular,” i.e., to “harmonize,” commerce among the states.
At least prior to the emergence of the Administrative State, however, the degree of harmonization was always dependent on the willingness of the people, acting through their representatives in Congress, to do so. But the degree to which Congress has been willing
to regularize commerce, while increasing over time, has been insufficient for those who would like Congress to preempt virtually every
state law seen as a barrier to commerce.195
Congress’ ability to harmonize commerce or trade with other nations depends on reciprocal consent. Accordingly, Congress’ power
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/3/free-trade-agreement-americasand-legal-harmonization.
191
Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 100.
192
19 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012).
193
Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 101 (2001).
194
See THESAURUS.PLUS, https://thesaurus.plus/related/harmonize/make_regular (last visited Apr. 10, 2018).
195
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly favors preemption of state laws
in a number of areas of commerce. See U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM,
Preemption/Federalism,
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/preemption-federalism (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
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with respect to international trade is to regulate commerce “with”
foreign nations. That language reflects the equal status of sovereign
states. Trade agreements, beginning with CUSFTA and NAFTA and
now USMCA, embody provisions like Chapter 19 and Chapter 10
in order to avoid dependence on the continued willingness of each
sovereign to cooperate with one or more other sovereigns.
The sovereign nations of Europe have mostly transferred power
over trade to institutions of the European Union (EU). Nevertheless,
they remain essentially sovereign as long as each can legally withdraw from the EU, as Britain has voted to do. Even without exercising their right to withdraw, EU countries remain sovereign as long
as they control their own military forces. The EU is not a state, but
a confederation created by successive treaties.
The Federalist recognizes that confederations have a certain utility for specific, limited purposes:
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea
of a league or alliance between independent nations
for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a
treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good
faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist
among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and nonobservance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate.196
As the history of the European treaties culminating in the EU
and now Brexit demonstrates, the continued existence of individual,
equal sovereigns prevents permanent, complete integration of a
multi-state economy. Nevertheless, trade agreements have taken inspiration from the EU in moving to create permanent, superintending institutions, such as, most prominently, the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the reincarnation of the failed ITO. Without a sovereign or a superintending institution with enforcement powers, the
degree of harmonization will continue to depend on the wills of the
sovereigns involved.
196

THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 170.
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“The impulse to reduce diversity among the legal systems governing commerce has manifested itself for as long as people have
traded across political boundaries.”197 The efforts from ancient
Rome, to the United States, to the European Union,198 “involve the
imposition of a unified body of rules by an institution with at least
some sovereign powers, or the creation of coherent rules in the absence of any nation state.”199
At some point, harmonization of commercial law comes into
conflict with sovereignty. Beyond that point, further harmonization
depends on the transfer of some sovereign powers over trade to a
superintending institution, as occurred in the EU. Still, as Alan
Holmer, the U.S. Trade Representative at the time, stated in his testimony on CUSFTA, “[t]here never has been, and likely never will
be, perfectly free trade between any two independent sovereign
countries.”200
C. NAFTA/USMCA’s Significance for the Regional and
Global Governance of Trade
As a superintending authority, NAFTA may have appeared to be
relatively mild,201 but it launched the United States into the regional
development of global governance.202 Of course, CUSFTA first fa-

197

Stephan supra note 189, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
199
Id. at 4.
200
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational
Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1988) (Prepared Statement of Ambassador Alan Holmer).
201
M. Angeles Villarreal & Ian F. Ferguson, The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH Service (May 24, 2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf (“The net overall effect of NAFTA
on the U.S. economy appears to have been relatively modest.”).
202
Morales, supra note 94. The author’s description of the article is, in part,
as follows:
The core argument of this study is that the regionalization process formalized under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has become a major
strategy of US trade diplomacy for advancing and expanding a new regulatory
framework for dealing with the pressures of globalization. Those pressures feature
198
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cilitated this development by initiating the binational panels. Nevertheless, while CUSFTA stated that one of its objectives would be to
“lay the foundation for further bilateral and multilateral” cooperation,”203 it contained no accession agreement. NAFTA, on the other
hand, contained an accession agreement which reflected a reworded objective to “establish a framework for further trilateral,
regional and multilateral cooperation.”204 USMCA has similar language.205
The U.S. did not follow through with its CUSFTA commitment
to harmonize AD/CVD laws with Canada.206 The Congress that
passed CUSFTA could not bind a future Congress in our constitutional system.207 The CUSFTA legislation did bind the federal judiciary, absent a declaration that the binational panels are unconstitutional. Although explicitly explained as not a model for future trade
agreements,208 the binational panels became another one of those
government programs that never seems to go away.
It was the hope of a prominent international law scholar that the
binational panels would be a model and influence U.S. courts:

the re-organization of corporate competitive strategies, as well as a new disciplinary body for regulating market access in trade, investment and other related issues.
203
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 102(e), Jan. 2, 1988 (emphasis
added) [hereinafter CUSFTA].
204
NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 102(f) (emphasis added).
205
USMCA preamble (“ESTABLISH a clear, transparent, and predictable legal and commercial framework for business planning, that supports further expansion of trade and investment.”).
206
Andrew Rosa, Old Wine, New Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 255 (1993).
207
See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (quoting the British jurist William Blackstone: “the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power,
is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon
earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it’s [sic] ordinances could
bind the present parliament.”)
208
See Anderson Senate CUSFTA Judiciary Hearing Statement, supra note 71
Similarly, the binational panel system is not, and is not intended to be, a model
for future agreements between the United States and its other trading partners. Its
workability stems from the similarity in the U.S. and Canadian legal systems.
With that shared legal tradition as a basis, the panel procedure is simply an interim
solution to a complex issue in an historic agreement with our largest trading partner.
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I think one can look forward to gradual harmonization of the perceptions and practices of the two nations as the body of precedent builds up in the decisions of the binational panels. I would hope, in fact,
that U.S. courts in cases not covered by the panel
would – and I think the legislation ought to say
“should” – look at the recent opinions of the panels.209
NAFTA superseded CUSFTA and became “a key strategy for
advancing and expanding a regulatory framework for global governance.”210 Supposedly, the United States thereby ensured that its
priorities would prevail.211 The United States’ involvement in global
governance, however, has de-prioritized the Constitution.
Alan Wm. Wolf, now Deputy Director of the WTO, has described the U.S.-driven legal framework for international trade and
the significance of NAFTA.212 He explains that the process began
with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934213 and acquired
its vision in language found in the Atlantic Charter by which Roosevelt and Churchill committed their countries “to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access,
on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world
which are needed for their economic prosperity;” and stated their
desire “to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations
in the economic field.”214 According to Wolf,

209
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational
Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1988) (Testimony of Andreas Lowenfeld).
210
Nakagawa, supra note 187 (discussing Isidro Morales, supra note 94).
211
See Morales, supra note 94, at 19 (“As long as the US economy keeps innovating and growing, North
American integration defined according to US standards will remain legitimated
and a blue print for future negotiations . . . .”).
212
Alan Wm. Wolff, Stressed in an Age of Populism: Recommendations for
Changes in U.S. Trade Law and Policy, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW (2017), available at http://iielaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AlanWolff-IIEL-Issue-Brief-April-2017-Final.pdf.
213
19 U.S.C. § 1351.
214
Wolff, supra note 212, at 4 (quoting parts of the Atlantic Charter).
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From these beginnings, parallel tracks continued to
be taken over the next three quarters of a century -with enactment of a number of statutory compacts
between the President and the Congress loosely
termed “trade negotiating authority” and in an iterative process of multilateral negotiations to construct
a rules-based world trading system -- first in the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization
(the ITO, that the U.S. did not ratify), but then in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
which the Executive Branch forged ahead with without the express approval of Congress until the 1970s,
and finally the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Uruguay Round in 1994.
These two elemental legal foundations, domestic
statutes and multilateral rules, with the addition of
some free trade agreements -- most prominently
NAFTA, are the legal framework for America’s conduct of international trade.215
D. The Rule of Law or The Rule of Rules?
Wolf continued by emphasizing that “[t]he rule of law must govern what our government can and should do in the field of international trade.”216 He rightly said this occurs “through our interventions before administrative and policy agencies of the Executive
Branch, through appearances before Congress and the International
Trade Commission, before U.S. courts and international tribunals,
and in the press.”217 Unfortunately, prior to the adoption of NAFTA,
virtually none of that legal scrutiny was applied to the DSMs. This,
despite what Wolf explained, has been the significance of NAFTA
in shaping the global governance of trade.
For the U.S., the Constitution embodies our application of The
Rule of Law. To violate the Constitution in pursuit of a global set of
trade rules does not advance the Rule of Law. Although trade law
experts may mouth the phrase “Rule of Law,” too often what they
215
216
217

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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really are promoting is the rule of rules. These are very complicated
rules that allows a small number of trade-law specialists to make
politically unaccountable decisions that extend the Administrative
State to the global level.
The Rule of Law involves both an ideal and its actual instantiation in particular countries. The ideal—sought but never fully
achieved—refers to principles of justice that restrain the exercise of
governmental power. As an actual state of affairs, the Rule of Law
can only exist within the bounds of a particular political body with
powers to enforce the rules of law.218
Under the Articles of Confederation, the ideal of the Rule of
Law—so prominent in the Declaration of Independence—was widespread. Regardless of whether and to what extent the rule of law
existed within the borders of the separate states,219 it did not in fact
exist among the whole group of states. Certainly, on matters of trade,
states were not adhering to the provisions of the Articles.220 The Articles could not enforce the Rule of Law because it did not provide
for executive and judicial powers to do so.
218

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 170
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law,
that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for
disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or
commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than
advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted
in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military
force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The
first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be
employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there
is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort,
be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their
duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an
association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the
communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of
war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience.
Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor
would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.
219
For a description of the lawlessness in some states, see Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
220
See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1786) in HANK
EDMONDSON, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION (2012):
The States are every day giving proofs that separate regulations are more likely to
set them by the ears than to attain the common object. When Massachusetts set
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Some may think that multilateral agreements are a modern development, widely used only since after World War II. While significant since World War II, the Constitution’s Framers were quite
familiar with such arrangements and rejected them. Federalist 15
explains that experience shows that such arrangements fail to produce the expected benefits.
In the early part of the present century there was an
epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly
hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a
view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the
peace of that part of the world, all the resources of
negotiation were exhausted, and triple and quadruple
alliances were formed; but they were scarcely
formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no
other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and
which oppose general considerations of peace and
justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or
passion.221
The European Union is an expansion of its 18th century predecessors. It has sought to overcome the weakness of previous confederations lacking judicial and executive powers by adding a powerful
European Court of Justice and the European Commission. Still, it
has been experiencing the limitations described by The Federalist.
More recently, the EU has attempted unsuccessfully to move from a
multilateral-treaty/confederation to a constitution.222 Nevertheless,

on foot a retaliation of the policy of Great Britain, Connecticut declared her ports
free. New Jersey served New York in the same way. And Delaware I am told has
lately followed the example in opposition to the commercial plans of Pennsylvania. A miscarriage of this attempt to unite the states in some effectual plan will
have another effect of a serious nature . . . .I almost despair of success.
221
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 170.
222
Andrea Broughton, European Council Fails to Agree on a Constitutional
Treaty, EUROFOUND (Dec. 16, 2003), https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/european-council-fails-to-agree-on-constitutional-treaty.
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as a confederation, the European Union remains inherently unstable,
as demonstrated by Brexit and the bailout of Greece.223
NAFTA and the WTO were created around the time of the
expansion and transition of the European Economic Community
into the European Union. Those were heady days. Unfortunately,
the creation of the EU inspired, in part, NAFTA and the WTO – and
now the USMCA – to include semi-governmental features which
collide with the Constitution and The Rule of Law in the United
States.
CONCLUSION
Rejecting dispute mechanisms in multilateral trade agreements
does not constitute opposition to free trade. Trade between and
among countries is never fully free. It is a matter of degree. International trade is always managed trade-- that is managed by separate
sovereigns or some international organization. The degree of freedom and the volume of trade lies within the trade agreement and the
mechanism(s) for enforcing the agreement. That power lies either
with each of the sovereigns or with some superintending institution.
The U.S. court experience with the so-called “dormant commerce clause” makes the point. Although often difficult to discern,
a difference does exist between a state’s laws, the purpose of which
are to protect in-state interests, and state laws having a legitimate,
non-protectionist purpose, but which inhibit some trade from outside the state. From the viewpoint of out-of-state corporations, the
non-uniformity of laws inherent in the U.S. federal system creates
countless “trade barriers.” Federal courts, as the superintending institution, seem to have developed a presumption that strongly disfavors the states under the dormant commerce clause.224
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See Ashley Kirk, European Debt Crisis: It’s not just Greece that’s drowning in debt, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/european-debt-crisis-not-just-greece-drowning-debt/.
224
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It is not unreasonable to expect that international tribunals looking at non-tariff trade barriers will follow along a similar path. From
an international perspective, the U.S. and other countries often view
each other’s laws that differ from their own as non-tariff “trade barriers.” The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act225 “eliminated the 1974 Act’s distinction between tariff and non-tariff trade
barriers, and with it, some of the special considerations for trade
measures impacting consumer protection, employee health and
safety, labor standards, and environmental standards.”226 When international trade DSMs decide these issues, they are resolving matters that should be decided by U.S. courts.
It should not surprise lawmakers that many Americans have a
sense that “We the People” are losing our powers of self-government in extremely complex international trade agreements. Ordinary
Americans do not pretend to understand the intricacies of trade law
and negotiations, as indeed few lawyers understand. They do expect
their representatives to protect U.S. laws enacted through constitutional processes from being undone by international bodies.
The impasse over Chapter 10 (formerly Chapter 19) dispute resolution mechanism concerns self-governance, a term often simply
equated with “Sovereignty.” The two are not coequal, however.
Each of the countries in USMCA has given up what might seem to
be a relatively small amount of its self-governing powers. Canada
and Mexico each certainly wants to preserve its own national sovereignty, especially vis-a-vis the United States. From their perspectives, on the one hand, USMCA’s dispute settlement mechanism
may somewhat limit the self-governing powers of each country. But
on the other hand, those dispute settlement procedures easily allow
parties to block access by opponents to U.S. federal courts. Canada
and Mexico gain more than they give up in terms of self-governance.
In terms of U.S. self-governance, USMCA’s dispute settlement
mechanisms are a complete negative. Its DSMs and the interpretations that were sometimes necessary from the NAFTA Free Trade
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Commission227 constitute supra-constitutional governing mechanisms. As such, they necessarily conflict with the Constitution. No
other country in the world has as well-considered a constitution as
that of the United States. The Constitution’s innovative protections
for trade and investment have proven to be key to U.S. economic
success. Those who would transplant a few of those innovations to
supra-national bodies fail to realize or ignore that the mechanism
they may consider “effective” requires other elements of our Constitution in order to actually be effective.
USMCA not only allows U.S. nationals to be denied access to
U.S. courts without their consent,228 it is also a far inferior substitute.
It may purport to provide a neutral and fair process, but NAFTA did
not and the USMCA cannot provide “independent judges.”229 Without the salary and tenure protections that define what it means to be
an “independent judge,”230 the unconsented-to process is offensive
to the constitutional sensibilities of U.S. citizens. If aware of what
the dispute settlement mechanism does, most U.S. citizens would
oppose it regardless of how great the promised trade benefits.231
NAFTA and the Treaty for the European Union expanded multilateralism in trade and governance.232 Support for NAFTA and the
World Trade Organization benefited from the enthusiasm, at the
227
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time, for a “New World Order.” The hopes inspired by the EU, however, have faded. Brexit, the wave of refugees, and the several debt
crises have demonstrated that the current confederal arrangement is
not a stable structure. EU enthusiasts, therefore, have been advocating greater integration and attempting - so far unsuccessfully - to
create a constitution. The purpose of a constitution would be to create a state, having at least external sovereignty. Slowly, EU integrationists have been learning by experience the wisdom of the political
principle laid down in The Federalist that confederations, useful for
certain purposes, do not work as governing arrangements.233
The USMCA, as a multilateral agreement was almost not completed. At one point, the U.S. divided the negotiations, dealing bilaterally with Mexico without Canada. President Trump said that
negotiations were going well with Mexico, but not Canada.234
Consciously or not, the Trump Administration’s strong preference for bilateral trade agreements, over multilateral ones, is constitutionally more prudent. Even better would be bilateral treaties, for
reasons discussed above.235 Bilateral agreements normally do not
create governing bodies. In CUSFTA, the U.S. hastily agreed to the
binational panels as an interim agreement.
Opposition in the U.S. to multilateral trade agreements that include governing mechanisms is not necessarily motivated by isolationist or anti-free trade views. Admittedly, some U.S. citizens who
oppose multilateral trade agreements do so for self-interested and/or
isolationist reasons. General opposition, however, to any multilateral agreement which includes supranational governing institutions,
such as NAFTA and the WTO, can legitimately represent a defense
of U.S. self-governance under our Constitution. U.S. sovereignty,
and promotion of fully free, bilateral trade are easily compatible.236
Those who work for institutionalized global governance of trade
have not learned the lessons of how and why the “American Experiment” has succeeded so well. As Justice Kennedy has written, “The
233
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Framers split the atom of sovereignty [so that] our citizens would
have two political capacities, one state and one federal.”237 Few U.S.
citizens are interested in having a third political capacity, which is
global.
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